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Abstract
We analyze the reporting strategies of firms and the investigation strategies of auditors in
an archetype principles-based financial reporting system. To this end, we add a verification
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We show that for a principles-based system to work properly, firms should bear a sufficient
share of the cost of a thorough investigation. Furthermore, we find that a principles-based
system is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it leads to a plausible investigation strategy
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principles-based system only indirectly weakens firms’ incentives to report aggressively.
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1 Introduction
A sequence of corporate accounting scandals in the early 2000’s (notorious examples
are Enron and Worldcom) has escalated the debate on principles-based versus rules-
based financial reporting systems1. A concern has risen that reporting standards have
become too rules-based. The idea is that bright-line guidance encourages gaming
the system and aggressive reporting2. Moreover, rules limit the role of auditors
to only checking compliance to these rules. A more principles-based system would
move emphasis from the acceptability of reporting practices to the appropriateness
of reporting practices3.
The accounting scandals illustrate that the root of aggressive reporting is that
managers want to paint too rosy a picture of the financial position and performance
of their firms. In a rules-based system, this desire provides managers with incentives
to report near the limits of rules. As long as managers do not violate reporting rules,
it is hard for auditors to constrain this manner of aggressive reporting.
The bad experiences with the rules-based system do not show that a more
principles-based system would perform better. Clearly, a shift to a principles-based
system does not remove managers’ desires to present a too favorable picture of their
firms. One might even think that less guidance and fewer rules widen the scope for
1“Escalating”, because already in 1994, the Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence recom-
mended a shift towards a more principles-based accounting system (see Caplan and Kirschenheiter,
2004).
2We define aggressive reporting in accordance with Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996), p.44, and
Phillips (1999), p.167, as reporting methods that portray a company’s financial situation favorably
when those methods are not clearly indicated by the facts and the professional literature. We also
refer to Benston et al. (2006) and the Securities and Commission (July 2003) who conclude that
rules-based regulation has resulted in less informative and more misleading financial statements.
3We refer to the examples mentioned in the introduction of Schipper (2003), for example Joseph
Berardino, former CEO of Arthur Andersen, Walter Wriston, former CEO of Citicorp, Sir David
Tweedie, former chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board and Harvey Pitt, former
chairman of the US Securities Exchange Commission.
1
aggressive reporting. On the other hand, in appealing to principles, auditors may
better combat aggressive reporting. This in turn may discourage firms to report
aggressively.
In this paper, we develop an auditing game to examine reporting behavior of
firms and investigating behavior of auditors in an archetype principles-based sys-
tem. Our objective is to identify the weak and strong features of a principles-based
system. We believe that a game-theoretical model can help us better understand
the functioning of a principles-based system for three reasons. First, at the heart
of auditing lies a problem of asymmetric information. Game theory is a well-known
tool for investigating such problems. Second, reporting behavior of firms is likely to
depend on investigating behavior of auditors and vice versa. The interdependency
of the behavior of players calls for a game theoretical approach. Third, in game
theory, agents are fully rational. Our model shows how rational managers of firms
report when they are confronted with rational auditors, and how rational auditors
investigate reports prepared by rational managers. In the context of auditing, the
assumption of rationality seems plausible, as both players are generally professionals
who know “the game”, so to speak.
Our game exhibits four key features. First, the objective of the auditor is to
determine the financial position, the value, of a firm. The “principle” is thus that
the firm’s report should reflect its actual financial position. Though the firm is
supposed to report truthfully, it wants the market to overestimate its value. A well
known motivation for this assumption is that the lending conditions of a firm often
depend on creditors’ perceptions of its financial position. The firm’s desire to mislead
external parties opens the role for an auditor as a verifier of information.
A second important feature of the model is asymmetric information. At the
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beginning of the game, the firm is better informed about its financial position than
the auditor. The firm knows its value, while the auditor only knows that the value
lies in a certain interval. The firm prepares a report about its financial position.
On the basis of this report, the auditor decides whether to conduct a thorough
investigation or not. Through the investigation, the auditor learns the firm’s value.
Investigation is costly, however. These costs are partially borne by the auditor and
partially borne by the firm. If in our model, auditors were always to investigate
firms thoroughly, they would always learn the financial position of the firms. Such
an outcome, however, would have been expensive in terms of investigation costs. In
the present paper, we identify equilibria in which firms voluntarily disclose at least
some information and auditors do not always choose for a thorough investigation.
A third main feature of our game is the absence of rules and fines. The absence
of rules makes it hard to impose fines as, almost by definition, in the absence of
rules, rules cannot be violated. Firms are allowed to report anything, but what
they report generally affects the probability that they will be investigated. The
auditor’s investigation strategy may discipline firms. We are aware that in practice,
a principles-based system always has some rules. By abstracting from rules, we
highlight the difference between rules-based reporting systems and principles-based
systems.
Finally, we allow the firm to send a report that leads to a certain thorough
investigation. One can think of a firm that by law should prepare a report, but
refuses to do so. We, thus, give the firm the option of obstructing the system. The
resulting model is sufficiently rich and possesses many kinds of equilibria, some of
which do not seem plausible. In our analysis, we focus on the most meaningful
equilibria of the model, which we refer to as Perfect Auditing Equilibria. In such
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equilibria, firms report according to their true value so that the reports are always
meaningful, and auditors perform a thorough audit with some probability but not
with certainty, so that at least sometimes the public finds out the firm value directly
from the firm’s report. We disregard equilibria in which a firm deliberately chooses
to obstruct the system. More specifically, we identify conditions under which the
Perfect Auditing Equilibria exist in which firms do not send reports that lead with
certainty to a thorough investigation.
We derive three main results. First, in a principles-based system, the firm should
bear a sufficiently large share of the cost of an audit. If the cost borne by the firm
is too small, only equilibria exist in which reports do not contain much informa-
tion about firms’ values. A high auditing cost for the firm discourages aggressive
reporting. Second, the reporting strategy of the firm is characterized by a partition
strategy. The lengths of the partitions indicate the precision of reports. Reports of
small values are relatively precise, while reports of high values are relatively impre-
cise. The maximum length of a partition depends on the cost of investigation borne
by the auditor. Third, the investigation strategy of the auditor is probabilistic. Gen-
erally, the higher is the value reported by the firm, the higher is the probability
that the auditor performs a thorough investigation. As the firm bears part of the
cost of an investigation, the auditor’s investigation strategy discourages aggressive
reporting. It does not eliminate aggressive reporting completely, however.
All in all, our results show that a principles-based system provides a mixed bless-
ing. On the one hand, under certain conditions, it leads to a plausible investigation
strategy of the auditor, in which “suspected” reports receive most attention. On
the other hand, a principles-based system only indirectly reduces firms’ incentives to
report aggressively. Rules in combination with fines in case of non-compliance may
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be a more effective way of combating aggressive reporting.
In section 2, we discuss related literature, and section 3 introduces the basic
theoretical model that is used in this paper. Section 4 analyzes the model, and
section 5 concludes and gives indications for further research. The appendix contains
some proofs.
2 Related Literature
The literature on auditing models is quite extensive. The seminal paper is by
Townsend (1979), in which an agent has to report information to a principal. The
problem is that the agent has an incentive to misreport. This incentive to misreport,
in turn, gives an incentive to the principal to verify the report. Townsend (1979)
examines how alternative verification procedures affect reporting.
A major application of auditing models is tax compliance. In the older literature
(see, for example, Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), the assumed verification strategy of
the tax authority is naive. This literature aims at determining the optimal probability
of verification irrespective of reported income. Reinganum and Wilde (1986) are
one of the first who allowed the tax authority to choose verification probabilities
contingent on reported income. Their paper shows that taxpayers with higher income
underreport less, and are verified with lower probability4. Our model is similar to that
of Reinganum and Wilde (1986) in that we also assume that the principal cannot
commit to a verification strategy. In this respect, we deviate from, for instance,
Townsend (1979) and Border and Sobel (1987), who assume that the principal can
4Erard and Feinstein (1994) show that this result crucially relies on the assumption that no
“honest” taxpayers exist. Khalil (1997) applies the Reinganum and Wilde (1986) model to a setting
where a manager has an incentive to underreport the cost of production to the owner.
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commit to a verification strategy. We deviate from Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
in two main respects. First, we do not allow for direct fines. The reason for this
modeling choice is that fines are hard to impose in a pure principles-based financial
reporting system. Second, in our model, the firm’s report does not directly affect its
payoff. The firm wants the auditor to overestimate its value. The firm’s report is
cheap talk as in Crawford and Sobel (1982). In a model of tax compliance, unless
audited, misreporting directly leads to lower taxes to be paid.
Another application of auditing models is financial reporting by firms5. Morton
(1993) and Chatterjee et al. (2008) describe a game between a manager of a firm and
an auditor. The spirit of the game is similar to the tax compliance model proposed
by Reinganum and Wilde (1986). The manager has an incentive to underreport the
value of the firm to earn a rent. Based on the manager’s report, the auditor chooses
whether or not to audit the report. An audit is costly. If the manager is found to
misreport, he has to pay a penalty. Morton (1993) assumes that the auditor can
commit to an auditing strategy. Chatterjee et al. (2008) relax the commitment
assumption. We deviate from these studies in the same respects as we deviate from
the models of tax compliance.
As discussed in the introduction, our model investigates the incentives arising
from a purely principles-based financial reporting system. There are several theo-
retical studies on how relaxing reporting standards affects the reporting behavior of
firms. Dye and Verrecchia (1995) distinguish between an internal problem between
the manager and current shareholders on the one hand, and an external problem
between the manager and future shareholders on the other. They argue that under
5In the insurance literature, similar papers can be found that describe the reporting strategy
of a claimant and the auditing strategy of an insurance company, we refer to Picard (1996) and
Schiller (2006)
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certain conditions, tighter reporting standards can improve the external communica-
tion problem, but generally aggravate the internal communication problem. Stocken
and Verrecchia (2004) examine an environment in which firms possess relevant in-
formation for investors, which is not captured by a financial reporting system. In
such an environment, giving the manager reporting discretion enables the manager
to convey more information. However the cost of discretion is, that it offers the firm
more scope for misreporting. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) make the interesting
point that tightening reporting standards may shift the manager’s attention from
accounting earnings management to real earnings management. The contribution of
our paper to this literature is limited in the sense that we exclusively focus on the
performance of a purely principles-based system. However, in contrast to most other
studies in this field, we also examine the effect of a principles-based system on the
behavior of the auditor.
A cheap-talk game a la Crawford and Sobel (1982) has already been used in the
literature to model financial reporting. Gigler (1994) points out that as financial re-
ports address multiple audiences, there is scope for voluntary disclosure of financial
information by firms. Fischer and Stocken (2001) examine the relationship between
the quality of the sender’s information and the quality of the information commu-
nicated. Surprisingly they find that a lower quality of information can improve
communication. We contribute to the cheap-talk literature by adding a verification
stage to the standard Crawford and Sobel (1982) model.
Our paper is also related to experimental research on the effect of the type of
financial reporting system on firms’ incentives to report aggressively (see Nelson
(2003) for a review of this literature). Jamal and Tan (2010) investigate whether
moving towards a principles-based reporting system reduces aggressive reporting by
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financial managers. They vary the reporting system (a rules-based or principles-
based reporting system) and the auditor type (rules-oriented, principles-oriented or
client-oriented). The paper finds that a move towards a principles-based system
often leads to less aggressive reporting. Jamal and Tan (2010) study an environment
in which the auditor always conducts a thorough investigation. Our model shows
that in such an environment, firms do not have incentives to report aggressively.
We also allow environments in which auditors do not always conduct a thorough
investigation. In such environments, firms are only indirectly discouraged to report
aggressively. More generally, our model offers predictions that can be tested in future
experiments.
3 Model
Our model describes an archetype principles-based system. In our game, there are
two active players, a firm (F ) and an auditor (A). We consider a situation where the
firm is legally obliged to issue a year report that provides accurate information about
its financial position. We model this year report as a value. The firm wants external
parties, the public, to overestimate its actual value. The auditor’s role is to verify
information. In our game, the auditor can choose between investigating the firm’s
report or not investigating it.6 If the auditor investigates, he learns the true value
of the firm, and reports this value to the public. If the auditor does not investigate,
the public observes the value reported by the firm. The auditor’s objective is that
external parties form an accurate perception of the firm’s value. In addition, the
6The idea is that there has been an initial audit, prepared by the firm and executed by the
auditor. This audit has led to a report. On the basis of this report, the auditor bases his decision
whether or not to conduct a thorough investigation.
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auditor takes his cost of an investigation into account.
We are aware that our model does not describe any real financial reporting sys-
tem. Financial reporting regulation, e.g., in the form of IFRS,7 determines reporting
standards and includes best-practise guidelines, but does not impose detailed in-
structions as a rules-based system does. An archetype principles-based system does
not exist in reality. Our model describes a principles-based system in the sense that
the auditor’s focus is on content, not on rules. In addition, we require that in equi-
librium, the firm prepares a legitimate report. However, we do allow the firm to
obstruct the system by giving it the opportunity to send an illegitimate report. An
illegitimate report leads to an investigation with certainty. We identify equilibria in
which firms only send legitimate reports.
More formally, our game extends a uniform linear version of the cheap-talk model
of Crawford and Sobel (1982) by adding an auditing stage. We assume that the firm’s
value v is uniformly distributed over the unit interval V = [0, 1]. Having observed
its value v ∈ V , the firm sends an initial report r0 to the auditor. Report r0 can be
legitimate, in which case, r0 ∈ V and its literal meaning is “my value is r0”, or it can
be illegitimate, which case is denoted by r0 = ∅. Thus, r0 ∈ R, where R ≡ V ∪{∅}.
Having received a report r0 ∈ V , the auditor decides whether to investigate the
firm, which is denoted by q = 1, or not, q = 0. If the report is r0 = ∅, the auditor
must investigate it. Hence, q = 1, if r0 = ∅. An investigation informs the auditor
about the true value v. As a result, if q = 1, the auditor sends an altered report
r1 = v to the public. Without investigation, r1 = r0.
The public observes the final report r1 ∈ V and whether investigation has taken
7The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) concern a set of international ac-
counting standards that prescribe how financial transactions should be represented in the financial
statements.
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place, q. It forms expectation vˆ of the value of the firm on the basis of r1 and q,
vˆ = E (v|r1, q). The preferences of the firm and the auditor are given by the following
utility functions:
uA(v, vˆ, q) = −|vˆ − v| − qcA (1)
uF (v, vˆ, q) = −|vˆ − (v + x)| − qcF (2)
where cF and cA are the investigation costs for the firm and the auditor, respectively,
and x measures by how much the firm wants the public to overestimate its value.
Equation (1) shows that the auditor wants the public to have a correct perception
of the firm’s value. Notice that both the firm and the auditor bear a part of the
investigation costs. Our focus is on equilibria in which some reports are investigated
with positive probability.
As an equilibrium concept, we use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, PBE here-
inafter, which satisfies the following additional requirements.
(a) In equilibrium, the set of values V is partitioned into a finite sequence of intervals,
and the firm only reports which interval its value belongs to.
(b) In equilibrium, there are no reports that are investigated with certainty.
The first requirement guarantees that in equilibrium, a firm with a higher value
is expected to report a higher value. We believe that the uniform-linear model con-
sidered here admits only such equilibria. However, since the single-crossing property
fails in our model, other types of equilibria may exist for other generic distributions
and loss functions.
The second requirement is an interpretation of a “proper” performance of the au-
10
diting system. It guarantees that all firm’s reports are trusted, at least partially. If
this requirement is dropped, other equilibria appear, in which there are such reports
that the auditor never trusts and, consequently, always investigates. This under-
mines the legitimacy of these reports. Thus, we focus on PBE that are similar to
equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (CS). We denote the intervals by (bi−1, bi), and the
corresponding partition by B ≡ {(bi−1, bi)}, i = 1, . . . , n, where n ≥ 1 is the number
of pooling intervals in B.
As is usual in cheap talk models, a firm’s exact reporting strategy is of no im-
portance for an equilibrium. For the audit system, however, there is a very natural
interpretation of the equilibrium reporting strategy: if the firm value v lies in an
interval (bi−1, bi), the firm reports any number r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) with equal probability.
Having observed a report r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi), the auditor investigates the firm with
probability pi ∈ [0, 1), and P ≡ {pi} is an auditor’s equilibrium investigation strat-
egy. Consequently, an equilibrium Ω can be written as a tuple Ω = 〈B,P 〉 consisting
of the reporting strategy B of the firm, and the investigation strategy P of the
auditor, such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) For any value v ∈ (bi−1, bi), sending any report r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) is optimal to the
firm.
(b) For any report r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi), investigating the firm with probability pi is optimal
to the auditor.
Investigation probability pi = 1 is excluded by our assumption that the firm must
have strict incentives to send a legitimate report. Auditor’s beliefs are implicit in
this characterization. In particular, having observed a report r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) the
auditor believes that r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) with the prior (uniform distribution). Moreover,
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if r0 = ∅, he investigates the firm irrespective of his beliefs. From now on, we call
an equilibrium of this kind a “perfect auditing equilibrium”, hereafter PAE.
4 Analysis
We analyze our model in three steps. First, we look at the auditor and analyze
which reports he investigates. Next, we look at the firm and analyze under which
conditions the firm sends a legitimate report. As a result, we obtain two conditions
that must necessarily hold in a PAE. Third, using these necessary conditions, we
derive conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. We illustrate
typical equilibria of the model with examples.
4.1 Problem of The Auditor
Suppose the auditor observes a report r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) in equilibrium. Let di be the
length of this interval:
di ≡ bi − bi−1
The length of di can be interpreted as the measure of the accurateness of the report
r0.
The auditor knows that the firm sends report r0 only when the true value is
v ∈ (bi−1, bi). Consequently, he faces the following trade-off.
(a) If the auditor investigates the firm (q = 1), the auditor pays auditing cost cA.
There are no other utility losses since the external parties get to know the exact
value, vˆ = v. The utility of the auditor is equal to uA(v, v, 1) = −cA.
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(b) If the auditor does not investigate the firm (q = 0), the auditor passes the firm’s
initial report r0 to the public. The auditor saves on the investigation cost but
bears a utility loss due to inaccurate reporting. Indeed, the public only knows
that v ∈ (bi−1, bi) and, therefore, the firm’s expected value is vˆ = 12(bi−1 + bi).
The utility of the auditor is
UA = E[uA(v, vˆ, 0)|v ∈ (bi−1, bi)] = − 1
di
∫ bi
bi−1
|vˆ − v|dv = −1
4
di
By comparing utilities for q = 0 and q = 1 we conclude that the auditor does not
investigate the firm if the length of the interval di is small relative to the audit cost
cA, i.e., pi = 0 if c
A > 1
4
di. If, to the contrary, c
A < 1
4
di, the auditor strictly prefers
to investigate. This should not happen in a PAE. Finally, if cA = 1
4
di, the auditor is
indifferent and can verify with any probability pi ∈ [0, 1).
Summarizing, the auditor investigates a firm’s report if it does not provide a
sufficient accurate estimate of the firm’s value. This strategy seems to make sense
in a principles-based system.
4.2 Problem of The Firm
Suppose the firm has a value v. By reporting r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) the firm is investigated
with probability pi. If investigated, vˆ = v and the firm gets utility u
F (v, v, 1) =
−(cF + x). Without investigation, vˆ = 1
2
(bi−1 + bi), and the firm gets utility
uF (v, vˆ, 0) = − ∣∣1
2
(bi−1 + bi)− (v + x)
∣∣
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Thus, when reporting r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi), the expected utility of the firm is
UF = −pi(cF + x)− (1− pi)
∣∣1
2
(bi−1 + bi)− (v + x)
∣∣
On the other hand, by sending a report r0 = ∅, the firm ensures investigation and
gets utility uF (v, v, 1) = −(cF + x). The incentive of the firm to report r0 = ∅
depends on the firm value v. Since the firm wants to overstate its value, it has the
strongest incentives to become investigated if its value is the highest in the partition,
v = bi. For v = bi , the firm does not send the illegitimate report r0 = ∅ only if
1
2
di ≤ cF . The following lemma summarizes the conditions for which the firm sends
a legitimate report and the auditor does not investigate a legitimate report with
certainty.
Lemma 1. In a perfect auditing equilibrium, di ≤ 4cA and di ≤ 2cF for all
intervals.
This lemma has the following simple interpretation. The archetypical principles-
based system only works properly if the firm’s reports are sufficiently accurate (which
is measured by the lengths of the intervals di). When reports become less accurate,
i.e., when the lengths of the intervals di increase, so that either of the conditions
of Lemma 1 fail, then either the auditor begins investigating with certainty, or the
firm starts sending illegitimate reports r0 = ∅. In the latter case, the report is also
investigated with certainty.
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4.3 Perfect Auditing Equilibria
If the investigation costs cA and cF are very large so that the investigation is too
costly, our model becomes similar to the model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Yet,
an important difference remains. In our auditing model, the firm can always initiate
an investigation by sending an illegitimate report r0 = ∅. Consequently, although
our model might have some of the cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (1982),
not all cheap-talk equilibria are necessarily equilibria in our model.
According to Lemma 1, a cheap talk equilibrium of Crawford and Sobel (1982) is
a perfect auditing equilibrium only if the lengths of intervals are small relative to the
auditing costs. Therefore, our principles-based model represents a robustness check
for cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in the presence of an inves-
tigation technology, which favors equilibria where more information is transmitted.
Since we are interested in the performance of the principles-based system, we first
focus on equilibria where investigation does take place. At the end of this section,
we also discuss PAE in which the auditor never investigates.
According to Crawford and Sobel (1982), for a given value of x, the cheap talk
equilibria may have not more than k intervals, where k is the largest integer satisfying
2k(k − 1)x < 1:
k = max{n : 2n(n− 1)x < 1}
First, we analyze equilibria for low investigation costs of the auditor, if cA ≤ 1
2
x.
The following proposition states the result.
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Proposition 1. Let the following conditions hold:
cA < 1
4
(
1
k
+ 2x(k − 1)) , cA ≤ 1
2
x and cA < 1
2
cF
Then, there exists a generically unique perfect auditing equilibrium in which
the length of the first interval is d1 < 4c
A, and all other intervals are of the
same length of 4cA. In this PAE, the first interval is never investigated, and
all other intervals are investigated with sequentially increasing probabilities.
According to Proposition 1, if the auditor’s investigation cost cA is sufficiently low,
there is only one option for the principles-based system to work. The set of firm
values V is split into intervals in such a way that all of them, except the very
first one, have a length equal to 4cA. Since the firm only reports to which interval
its value belongs to, there is always some uncertainty in the firm’s report. In the
first interval, the uncertainty is so small that the auditor does not find investigating
worthwhile. In all other intervals, the auditor is just indifferent between investigating
and not investigating. The way the auditor randomizes between investigating or not
is such that it induces the firm to report correctly the interval to which its value
belongs. In order to prevent firms with higher values from misreporting, investigation
probabilities for each next interval increase.
Figure 1 represents a numerically computed perfect auditing equilibrium for x =
0.3, cA = 0.1, and cF = 0.6. The vertical bars denote the interval boundaries, the
ladder-like step function p(v) is the probability that firm value v gets investigated.
The three dashed Λ-shaped curves represent the utilities for the firm of type v when
it reports r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) for i = 1, 2, 3. The curve for r0 ∈ (b1, b2) = (0.2, 0.6) is made
bold. All firms with a value v0 ∈ (0.2, 0.6), receive the highest utility when reporting
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within partition r0 ∈ (0.2, 0.6), represented by the bold line. The upper envelope of
these curves, represents the firm’s utility u(v) in equilibrium.
Let us consider a firm with a fixed value, let us say v0 = 0.35. Figure 1 shows
utility levels that the firm gets if it reports intervals (0, 0.2), (0.2, 0.6), and (0.6, 1).
The equilibrium is constructed in such a way that the firm always prefers to report
the true interval, in this case r0 ∈ (0.2, 0.6).
Figure 1: Equilibrium partition, investigation probabilities, and firm’s utility for x = 0.3, cA = 0.1,
and cF = 0.6.
Next, we analyze equilibria for high investigation cost of the auditor, when cA ≥
1
2
x. The following proposition states the result.
Proposition 2. Let the following conditions hold:
cA < 1
4
(
1
k
+ 2x(k − 1)) , cA ≥ 1
2
x, and cA < 1
2
cF
17
Then, there exists, possibly not unique, a perfect auditing equilibrium in which
the first k1 intervals, k1 ≥ 1, are of increasing length, and the remaining k2 ≥ 1
intervals are of the same length of 4cA. In this PAE, the first k1 intervals
are never investigated, and all the remaining intervals are investigated with
sequentially increasing probability. Moreover, if cA < x then, generically, k1 =
1, and the equilibrium is unique.
According to Proposition 2, if the auditor’s investigation costs are larger than or
equal to 1
2
x but smaller than 1
2
cF , the principles-based system still leads to intuitive
strategies. When cA ∈ (1
2
x, x), proposition 2 just extends the results of proposition
1. However, when cA > x it becomes different in two main respects. First, the
equilibrium may have more than one initial interval where the auditor does not
investigate, and, second, equilibria multiplicity may arise. In all other respects, the
cases of high and low values of cA, represented by propositions 1 and 2, are similar.
The following figure represents a numerically computed perfect auditing equi-
librium for x = 0.01, cA = 0.064, and cF = 0.15. The vertical bars denote the
interval boundaries, the ladder-like step function p(v) is the probability that firm
value v gets investigated. Seven dashed Λ-shaped curves represent utilities of the
firm of type v when it reports r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) for i = 1, . . . , 7. One such function
r0 ∈ (b1, b2) = (0.024, 0.088) is made bold. The upper envelope of these curves,
represents the firm’s utility u(v) in equilibrium.
Figure 2 also shows the utility levels that the firm of value v0 = 0.35 receives when
reporting a value in the different intervals. It receives the highest utility when it
reports r0 ∈ (b4, b5) = (0.336, 0.52), i.e., the true interval to which its value belongs.
One can see that no investigation takes place in the first six intervals, only the
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remaining seventh interval is investigated with positive probability. This equilibrium
is not unique. There is another PAE for the same values of x, cA and cF with n = 4
partitions, presented in Figure 3. One can clearly see the violation of the single-
crossing property in our model, since some of the drawn Λ-shaped utility functions
intersect twice.
It is interesting to compare the two PAE presented in Figures 2 and 3. The first
PAE of Figure 2, with n = 7 is the most informative equilibrium of our auditing
model: the number of the reported intervals is maximal. In addition, in this equilib-
rium, the investigation intensity of the auditor is the lowest: the ex-ante probability
that the firm is investigated is
∑
i dipi ≈ 0.024. The second PAE, with n = 4, to
the contrary, is the least informative PAE: the number of the reported intervals is
minimal. To support this equilibrium, the investigation intensity is much higher:
the ex-ante probability that the firm is investigated is
∑
i dipi ≈ 0.40, i.e., 16 times
higher than in Figure 2. Apart from these two extreme PAE, there are two other
equilibria with n = 5 and n = 6 partitions in equilibrium for the same values of x,
cA and cF .
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Figure 2: Equilibrium partition, investigation probabilities, and firm’s utility for x = 0.01, cA =
0.064, and cF = 0.15, for n = 7.
Figure 3: Equilibrium partition, investigation probabilities, and firm’s utility for x = 0.01, cA =
0.064, and cF = 0.15, for n = 4..
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In the previous analysis, i.e., in propositions 1 and 2, we have assumed that
cA < 1
2
cF . We finish this section by analyzing the performance of the principles-
based reporting system when this condition fails. Suppose that cA > 1
2
cF . In other
words, we assume that the cost for the firm cF becomes very low. Then, only the
following two cases are possible. First, it can be that all intervals in equilibrium
partitions are smaller than 4cA. In this case, no investigation takes place because
the auditor strictly prefers not to investigate. Second, it can be that some, in fact,
the longest last one, interval is of the length equal to 4cA. But then, according to
Lemma 1, this is not a perfect auditing equilibrium, since di = 4c
A > 2cF . Thus, we
get our next result.
Proposition 3. Let cA > 1
2
cF . Then, a perfect auditing equilibrium where
investigation takes place with positive probability does not exist.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 3 recall that at the second half of
any partition, a firm’s report leads the auditor to underestimate its value. The firm,
however, wants the auditor to overestimate its value. A direct implication is that
these firms want the auditor to learn their real values. The firm can do so by sending
an illegitimate report. The wider is an interval, the stronger is the incentive of a
firm with v close to the end of the partition to send an illegitimate report. Assume
such a firm. In an equilibrium with investigation, the length of the largest interval
depends on cA. A high cA therefore encourages the firm to send m = ∅. The cost
of sending m = ∅ equals cF . Only if cF is large relative to cA, the firm with a value
close to the end of a partition does not want to send an illegitimate report.
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5 Discussion of the Results
In a principles-based reporting system, as usual, the auditor’s investigation strategy
is conduct a thorough investigation if the benefits exceed the costs. The benefits of
the investigation depend on the auditor’s belief about the accurateness of a firm’s
report. In equilibrium, when a firm wants to avoid an investigation and the auditor’s
costs of an investigation are not too large, the investigation strategy is probabilistic.
Moreover, the auditor’s investigation decision is contingent on the value reported by
the firm. Generally, a higher reported value does not decrease the probability of
investigation. We believe that our model yields an intuitive strategy regarding the
auditor’s investigation decisions.
The firm’s partition strategy we have derived, is perhaps somewhat artificial. In
particular, the idea that a firm reports different values with equal probability is not
very appealing in an environment where the firm wants external parties to overesti-
mate its value. However, as discussed earlier, in cheap-talk games the exact reporting
strategy is not important. What matters is that in equilibrium, a firm’s report con-
tains information but leaves some uncertainty. So, an auditor who has received a
report learns something about the firm’s value, but he realizes that the actual value
of the firm is possibly different (perhaps likely to be lower, in the case that firms
report upper bounds of partitions). Put in this light, we find the predictions of our
model regarding the firm’s reporting strategy also intuitive.
What does our game tell us about the functioning of a principles-based system?
Our results show that a key parameter is cF , the costs of an investigation borne by
the firm. It plays two roles. First, if cF is very small, no perfect auditing equilibrium
exists. A principles-based financial reporting system fails. The reason is that some
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firms want to be investigated. As a result, they have incentives to send illegitimate
reports. Second, cF is a deterrent. A high cF weakens a firm’s incentive to misre-
port. The reason is that by exaggerating its value, the firm raises the probability
of an investigation and, in turn, of incurring cF . As far as cF can be interpreted
as an implicit penalty, it is particularly imposed on firms having high values. It is
not imposed on firms that misreport most severely. We find this an unjust way of
penalizing.
Another important parameter of the model is cA, the costs of an investigation
borne by the auditor. If cA is large, the auditor only investigates firms that report
very high values. The resulting game has multiple equilibria, as is often the case
in cheap-talk models. For lower values of cA, investigation becomes more common.
For sufficiently low values of cA, a unique equilibrium exists in which all, but one,
reporting intervals are of equal length.
Although the main objective of our paper is to analyze the performance of a
principles-based system, our results may also shed some light on price setting for
auditing activities. In our model, the investigation decision is regarded as an expan-
sion of normal auditing activities. There is some literature showing that performing
additional auditing activities lead to costs for both the auditor and the firm; see e.g.,
Johnstone et al. (2004), Schadewitz and Vieru (2009), and Zhang et al. (2011). This
is in line with our model.
The general lesson that can be learnt from our analysis is that a principles-based
system does not eliminate firms’ incentives to misreport. Through assigning a part
of the investigation cost to firms, firms’ incentives to misreport can be weakened. As
a deterrent, however, cF is indirect and disproportionably hits firms that have high
values.
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Despite our results are obtained under very restrictive modeling assumptions,
they may hold qualitatively, we believe, in more general settings. For example, our
result that in equilibrium, the investigation probability is non-decreasing in the re-
ported value is just the reflection of the firm’s incentive to overstate its value and,
as such, does not depend on the value distribution and the exact shape of the utility
function. The uniqueness of PAE for small cA follows from the fact that in the limit,
when cA converges to zero, our “cheap-talk with costly verification” model converges
to a standard “costly signaling” model, and our PAE becomes a unique perfectly
separating equilibrium thereof. In this limit, the value distribution plays no particu-
lar role, and the utility function only determines the investigation probabilities. One
of our most restrictive assumptions is that we consider an archetype principles-based
system by assuming away all fines. Nevertheless, neither of our characterization
results change if we assume that a fine is imposed on the firm which sends an ille-
gitimate report. The only consequence of this generalization is that PAE will exist
also for small values of cF , since the fine will play the role of the latter. This can be
seen as a simple robustness check of our “perfect auditing equilibrium” concept.
Another restrictive assumption is that by investigating the firm, the auditor learns
its true value. It is debatable whether or not the true value of a firm exists. This
makes the functioning of a principles-based system even more difficult. In the same
vein, we have assumed that the auditor only serves the public interests. In practice,
auditors are likely to have alternative motives, especially if they consider firms as
clients. In order to address this issue, our model needs an extension to allow for
imperfect information transmission from the auditor to the public. Yet another
possible generalization of the model is to make it more “rules-based” by allowing for
penalties on, e.g., firm’s reports that differ significantly from the firm’s true value.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 is in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the proposition by construction. First, we de-
rive some necessary conditions for a PAE. Then, we show that if cF > 2cA, there
always exists a unique partition with the corresponding investigation probabilities,
which satisfies all these conditions. We end the proof by arguing that neither the
firm nor the auditor has a profitable deviation.
Expected utility of the firm with value v when it reports r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) and is in-
vestigated with probability pi is given by (2). By continuity, type v = bi must be
indifferent between reporting r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) and r0 ∈ (bi, bi+1), thus UF (bi, i, pi) =
UF (bi, i+ 1, pi+1). Depending on signs of pi and pi+1, we distinguish 4 cases.
(a) Case pi = pi+1 = 0. The indifference condition implies
1
2
di + x = |12di+1 − x|.
Since di+1 ≤ 4cA and 2cA < x, it follows that 12di+1 − x ≤ 2cA − x < 0, so that
the condition becomes di = −di+1. Thus, this case never happens.
(b) Case 0 = pi < pi+1 < 1. First, di+1 = 4c
A due to pi+1 > 0. The indifference
condition implies 1
2
di + x = pi+1(c
F + x) + (1 − pi+1)(x − 2cA), and finally,
pi+1 =
1
2
di+2c
A
cF+2cA
. Since di < 2c
F , it is always the case that pi+1 ∈ (0, 1). Finally,
since di+1 = 4c
A and di+1 < 2c
F , this case only happens when cF > 2cA.
(c) Case pi, pi+1 ∈ (0, 1). Since di = di+1 = 4cA in this case, the indifference
condition becomes pi(c
F+x)+(1−pi)(2cA+x) = pi+1(cF+x)+(1−pi+1)(x−2cA),
which implies that (1−pi+1) = cF−2cAcF+2cA (1−pi). Here we note that, first, pi+1 > pi,
and, second, this case only happens when cF > 2cA.
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(d) Case 1 > pi > pi+1 = 0. Since di = 4c
A in this case, the indifference condition
becomes pi(c
F + x) + (1 − pi)(2cA + x) = |12di+1 − x|. Since di+1 ≤ 4cA and
2cA < x, it follows that 1
2
di+1 − x ≤ 2cA − x < 0, so that the condition becomes
di+1 = −2
(
cFpi + 2c
A(1− pi)
)
< 0. Thus, this case never happens.
Combining the cases, we conclude, first, that pi+1 > pi ≥ 0 for all i, and, second,
that pi+1 > pi > 0 is only possible when c
F > 2cA. This implies that all the
intervals in the partition, apart from the very first one, are of length di = 4c
A,
and the investigation probabilities are given by (1 − pi) = (δ1)i−2(1 − p2), where
δ1 =
cF−2cA
cF+2cA
, and p2 =
1
2
d1+2cA
cF+2cA
> 0 = p1. The number of intervals with investigation
(n− 1) must be such that (n− 1) · 4cA < 1 ≤ n · 4cA. Thus, n must be the smallest
integer satisfying n ≥ 1
4cA
, and, consequently, d1 = 1 − 4cA(n − 1). If it turns out
that n = 1
4cA
, which is a non-generic case, all n intervals are of equal lengths, and
the investigation probability p1 in the first interval is undetermined and leads to
equilibrium multiplicity.
In order to prove that the proposed firm’s and auditor’s strategy form an equilib-
rium, we show that neither the firm nor the auditor has a profitable deviation. This
is true by construction for the auditor. Let the firm of value v ∈ (bi−1, bi) report
r0 ∈ (bj−1, bj), for some j. We compute the net benefitD0 = UF (v, j, pj)−UF (v, i, pi)
from the deviation:
D0 = Zj − Zi, where Zi ≡ (1− pi)
(
(cF + x)− ∣∣v − bi + 12di + x
∣∣ ) (3)
Due to 2cA ≤ x, it follows that v−bi+ 12di+x = (v−bi−1)+(x− 12di) > (v−bi−1) > 0,
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so that
D0 = (1− pj)
(
(cF + x)− ∣∣v − bj + x+ 12dj
∣∣ )− (1− pi)
(
cF + 1
2
di − (v − bi−1)
)
We will show that, generically, D0 < 0 for all i 
= j.
It can be seen that, as a function of x, D0(x) is non-decreasing and is constant
for x > x0 ≡ bj − v − 12dj. Thus, D0(x) ≤ D0(x0) ≡ D1, where
D1 ≡ (1− pj)
(
cF + bj − 12dj
)
− (1− pi)
(
cF + 1
2
di + bi−1
)
+ v(pj − pi)
Depending on values of i and j, we consider the following four cases separately.
(a) Case j > i ≥ 2. In this case, bj = bi + 4cA(j − i), di = dj = 4cA. Hence,
D0 ≤ D1 = (1− pj)(cF − 2cA + bj)− (1− pi)(cF + 2cA + bi−1) + v(pj − pi)
Next, as a function of v, D1(v) is increasing, hence, D0 ≤ D1(v) ≤ D1(bi) ≡ D2,
where:
D2 = (1− pi)
(
(δ1)
j−i(cF + 2cA(2(j − i)− 1))− (cF − 2cA))
Finally, as a function of j, j > i, D2(j) is decreasing as its first difference is:
D3(j) ≡ D2(j + 1)−D2(j) = −4cA(1− pi)(δ1)j−i+1(j − i) < 0
Moreover, as D2(i) = 0 by construction, it follows that D2(j) < 0 for all j > i
and, consequently, so is D0 < 0. Thus, this type of deviation is strictly not
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profitable.
(b) Case i > j ≥ 2. Similar to the previous case, D1(v) is decreasing, hence,
D0 ≤ D1(v) ≤ D1(bi−1) ≡ D2, where D2 is:
D2 = (1− pi)
(
(δ1)
j−i
(
cF + 2cA(2(j − i) + 1)
)
− (cF + 2cA)
)
As a function of j, j ≥ i, D2(j) is increasing as its first difference is:
D3(j) ≡ D2(j + 1)−D2(j) = 4cA(1− pi)(δ1)j−i(1− δ1)(i− j − 1) > 0
Moreover, as D2(i) = 0, it follows that D2(j) < 0 for all j < i and, consequently,
so is D0 < 0. Thus, this type of deviation is strictly not profitable.
(c) Case j > i = 1. In this case, p1 = 0, b1 = d1 and, as in case (a), D0 ≤ D1(v) ≤
D1(bi) ≡ D2 where:
D0 ≤ D2 =
(
(δ1)
j−2 cF+4cA(j−1)−2cA
cF+2cA
− 1
)(
cF − 1
2
d1
)
D3(j) ≡ D2(j + 1)−D2(j) = −(δ1)j−2(1− δ1)4cA(j−1)cF+2cA
(
cF − 1
2
d1
)
< 0
Since D2(2) = 0, it follows that D0 ≤ D2 < D2(2) = 0.
(d) Case i > j = 1. In this case, as in case (b), D1(v) ≤ D1(bi−1) ≡ D2:
D2 =
(
cF + b1 − 12d1 − bi−1
)
− (1− pi)(cF + 2cA)
D3(i) ≡ D2(i+ 1)−D2(i) = −4cA
(
1− (δ1)i−2(1− p2)
)
< 0
Since D2(2) = 0, it follows that D0 ≤ D2 < D2(2) = 0.
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Combining the above four cases (a)-(d) we conclude that D0 < 0 for all i 
= j, which
implies that the firm of any value (except marginal values) is strictly better-off by
reporting a value from the same an interval which it’s true value belongs to. This
ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Propo-
sition 1 does. First, we derive some necessary conditions for a PAE. Then, we show
that if cF > 2cA, there exists a partition with the corresponding investigation proba-
bilities, which satisfies all these condition. We end the proof by showing that neither
the firm nor the auditor has a profitable deviation. Considering a type v = bi, who
must be indifferent between reporting r0 ∈ (bi−1, bi) and r0 ∈ (bi, bi+1), we distinguish
4 cases.
(a) Case pi = pi+1 = 0. The indifference condition implies
1
2
di + x = |12di+1 − x|.
The unique feasible solution is di+1 = di + 4x, as in CS.
(b) Case 0 = pi < pi+1 < 1. First, di+1 = 4c
A due to pi+1 > 0. The indifference
condition implies 1
2
di + x = pi+1(c
F + x) + (1 − pi+1)(x − 2cA), and finally,
pi+1 =
1
2
di−2cA+2x
cF−2cA+2x . Since di < 2c
F , it is always the case that pi+1 ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, since di+1 = 4c
A and di+1 < 2c
F , this case only happens when cF > 2cA.
(c) Case pi, pi+1 ∈ (0, 1). Since di = di+1 = 4cA in this case, the indifference
condition becomes pi(c
F+x)+(1−pi)(2cA+x) = pi+1(cF+x)+(1−pi+1)(2cA−x),
which implies that (1 − pi+1) = cF−2cAcF−2cA+2x(1 − pi). Here we note that, first,
pi+1 > pi, and, second, this case only happens when c
F > 2cA.
(d) Case 1 > pi > pi+1 = 0. Since di = 4c
A in this case, the indifference condition
becomes pi(c
F + x) + (1 − pi)(2cA + x) = |12di+1 − x|. First, it must be that
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1
2
di+1 > x as otherwise the equation implies
1
2
di+1 = −cFpi − 2cA(1 − pi) < 0.
Then 1
2
di+1 > x implies di+1 = 2c
Fpi + 4c
A(1 − pi) + 4x and, consequently,
di+1 > min{4cA, 2cF}. Thus, this case never happens.
Combining the cases, we conclude that a PAE has the following structure. The first
k1 intervals in equilibrium partition must be cheap talk intervals with increasing
lengths di = di−1 + 4x ≤ 4cA for i = 2, . . . , k1 and zero investigation probabilities
pi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , k1. The remaining k2 intervals must be intervals with constant
lengths di = 4c
A < 2cF and increasing investigation probabilities:
pk1+1 =
1
2
dk1−2cA+2x
cF−2cA+2x , and
(1− pi) = (δ2)i−1(1− pk1+1) for i = (k1 + 2), . . . , (k1 + k2)
where δ2 =
cF−2cA
cF−2cA+2x . Therefore, the set of the necessary conditions can be written
as follows:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
k1(d1 + 2x(k1 − 1)) + 4cAk2 = 1
d1 > 0
pk1+1 ≥ 0
dk1 ≤ 4cA
Since dk1 = d1 + 4x(k1 − 1), dk1 ≤ 4cA implies d1 ≤ cA − x(k1 − 1). Since d1 > 0, it
must be the case that cA > x(k1 − 1), which implies that k1 < min{1 + cAx , k} ≡ k¯1.
Using d1 =
1
k1
(
1 − 4cAk2 − 2xk1(k1 − 1)
)
from the first equation, and dk1 =
d1 + 4x(k1 − 1), we rewrite the above system of inequalities as
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
k2 <
1−2xk1(k1−1)
4cA
k2 ≤ 1+2xk1(k1+1)4cA − k1 (4)
k2 ≤ 1+2xk1(k1−1)4cA − k1
Thus, any equilibrium is defined by k1 = 0, . . . , k¯1 and k2 satisfying the above in-
equalities. The equilibrium exists only when cF > 2cA. When c
A
x
< 1, it follows that
k¯1 = 1, and, generically, k1 = 1 (the case k1 = 0 is non-generic and requires
1
4cA
to
be an integer). In this case, the system becomes
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
k2 <
1
4cA
k2 ≤ 14cA +
(
x
cA
− 1)
k2 ≥ 14cA − 1
so that the second inequality is redundant (due to x
cA
− 1 > 0), and the other two in-
equalities define k2 uniquely, which, in turn, uniquely defines d1 and the verification
probabilities pi.
In order to show equilibrium existence, we construct an equilibrium as follows.
Let us take k1 = 1. If there is an integer k2 ∈
[
1
4cA
− 1, 1
4cA
− 1 + x
cA
]
we are done.
If not, then it must necessarily be the case that 1
4cA
− 1 + x
cA
< 1
4cA
, which implies
x < cA < 1/4, k ≥ 2 and, therefore, k¯1 = min{1 + cAx , k} ≥ 2. Hence, we can take
k1 = 2. The rest of the proof is by induction.
Suppose that, for some t ≥ 1 (induction assumptions): k¯1 ≥ t, and (5) has no
solutions for k1 = 1, . . . , (t− 1). Let us take k1 = t. The system (5) reads as follows:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
k2 <
1−2xt(t−1)
4cA
k2 ≤ 1+2xt(t−1)4cA − t+ t xcA
k2 ≥ 1+2xt(t−1)4cA − t
If there is an integer k2 ∈
[
1+2xt(t−1)
4cA
− t, 1+2xt(t−1)
4cA
− t+ t x
cA
]
we are done. If not, then
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it must necessarily be the case that 1+2xt(t−1)
4cA
− t + t x
cA
< 1+2xt(t−1)
4cA
− t + 1, which
implies xt < cA. On the other hand, the suppositions cA < 1
4
(
1
k
+ 2x(k − 1)) and
x < cA imply
x <
1
4t
(
1
k
+ 2x(k − 1)
)
= 1
4tk
+ (k−1)
2t
x
and, therefore, x(2t − k + 1) < 1
2k
. By the induction assumption, k ≥ k¯1 ≥ t. If it
were that k = t, the last inequality would imply x < 1
2t(t+1)
= xt+1 and, therefore,
k ≥ t+1, a contradiction. Thus, it must necessarily be the case that k ≥ t+1, and,
hence
k¯1 = min{1 + cAx , k} ≥ min{1 + t, t+ 1} = t+ 1
Therefore, we can take k1 = t.
If the system had no solution, the induction argument would imply that x < c
A
t
for all natural t, a contradiction to x > 0. Hence, there is at least one solution,
hence, equilibrium. The inequality cA < 1
4
(
1
k
+ 2x(k − 1)
)
guarantees that it is not
a cheap talk equilibrium, hence, k2 ≥ 1.
Finally, similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we show that neither the firm nor
the auditor has a profitable deviation. This is true by construction for the auditor.
Let the firm of a value v ∈ (bi−1, bi) report r0 ∈ (bj−1, bj), for some j. We compute
the net benefit D0 = U
F (v, j, pj) − UF (v, i, pi) from the deviation, which is (3).
We consider the following five cases separately. Since the way of reasoning is very
similar to that of the proof of Proposition 1, we only provide resulting equations and
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inequalities.
(a) Case j > i > k1. In this case, di = dj = 4c
A, v < bi ≤ bj−1, so that:
Zj = (1− pj)
(
(cF − 2cA + 2x) + (v − bj−1)
)
On the other hand, Zi is a concave function of v. Thus, D0(v) = Zj − Zi is
convex and, therefore, D0(v) < 0 for all v ∈ (bi−1, bi) if and only if D0(bi−1) < 0
and D0(bi) < 0. We will show that this is indeed the case.
Subcase (a).1. At v = bi, Zi = (1− pi)(cF − 2cA) so that:
D0 = (1− pi)
(
(δ2)
j−i((cF − 2cA + 2x)− 4cA(j − i− 1))− (cF − 2cA)
)
Considering D0 as a function of j and denoting D1(j) ≡ 1(1−pi)(δ2)i−jD0(j) yields:
D1(j) = (c
F − 2cA + 2x)− 4cA(j − i− 1)− (δ2)i−j(cF − 2cA)
One may see that D1(i+ 1) = 0, and D2(j) ≡ D1(j + 1)−D1(j) < 0:
D2(j) = −4cA − (δ2)i−j−1(1− δ2)(cF − 2cA) < 0
Hence, D1(j) < 0, and so is D0(j) < 0.
Subcase (a).2. At v = bi−1, Zi = (1− pi)(cF − 2cA + 2x) so that:
D0 = (1− pi)
(
(δ2)
j−i
(
(cF − 2cA + 2x)− 4cA(j − i− 1)
)
− (cF − 2cA + 2x)
)
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In a similar way, we denote D1(j) ≡ 1(1−pi)(δ2)i−jD0(j), which yields:
D1(j) = (c
F − 2cA + 2x)− 4cA(j − i− 1)− (δ2)i−j(cF − 2cA + 2x)
D2(j) ≡ D1(j + 1)−D1(j) = −4cA − (δ2)i−j−1(1− δ2)(cF − 2cA + 2x) < 0
Hence, D1(j) < 0, and so is D0(j) < 0. Therefore, D0(v) < 0 for all v ∈ (bi−1, bi).
(b) Case i > j > k1. In this case, di = dj = 4c
A, v > bi−1 ≥ bj, so that:
Zj = (1− pj)(cF − 2cA − v + bj)
As in the previous case, Zi is a concave function of v. We will show now that
D0(bi−1) < 0 and D0(bi) < 0 so that the convex function D0(v) = Zj − Zi < 0
for all v ∈ (bi−1, bi). We consider two subcases.
Subcase (b).1. At v = bi, Zi = (1− pi)(cF − 2cA) so that:
D0 = (1− pi)(δ2)j−i
(
cF − 2cA + 4cA(j − i)− (δ2)i−j(cF − 2cA)
)
As a function of j, D1(j) ≡ 1(1−pi)(δ2)i−jD0(j) is increasing as
D2(j) ≡ D1(j + 1)−D1(j) = 4cA − (δ2)i−j−1(1− δ2)(cF − 2cA)
D2(j) = 2(2c
A − x) + 4x2
cF−2cA+2x +
(
1− (δ2)i−j−1
)
(1− δ2)(cF − 2cA) > 0
Together with D1(i) = 0, this implies that D1(j) < 0 for j < i, and, therefore,
D0 < 0.
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Subcase (b).2. At v = bi−1, Zi = (1− pi)(cF − 2cA + 2x) so that:
D0 = (1− pi)(δ2)j−i
(
cF − 2cA + 4cA(j + 1− i)− (δ2)i−j(cF − 2cA + 2x)
)
As a function of j, D1(j) ≡ 1(1−pi)(δ2)i−jD0(j) is increasing as
D2(j) ≡ D1(j + 1)−D1(j) = 4cA − (δ2)i−j−1(1− δ2)(cF − 2cA + 2x)
D2(j) = 2(2c
A − x) + (1− (δ2)i−j−1)(1− δ2)(cF − 2cA + 2x) > 0
Since D1(i−1) = 0, this implies that D1(j) < 0 for j < i, and, therefore, D0 < 0.
Thus, D0 < 0 in both subcases.
(c) Case i, j ≤ k1. This case corresponds to the pure cheap talk model, and the
result is well known: die to the single-crossing property, when the firm has no
incentives to deviate locally (marginally), neither it has incentives to deviate
globally. We prove it here as follows. Since pi = pj = 0, we have:
D0 =
∣∣v − bi + 12di + x
∣∣− ∣∣v − bj + 12dj + x
∣∣
Subcase (c).1. If j > i and v ≤ bi− 12di−x then D0 = (bi− 12di)−(bj− 12dj) < 0.
Subcase (c).2. If j > i and v ≥ bi − 12di − x then D0 = 2v − bi + 12di + 2x −
bj +
1
2
dj < 2bi − bi + 12di + 2x− bj + 12dj = −(j − i− 1)(2x(j + i− 1) + d1) ≤ 0.
Subcase (c).3. If j < i and v ≤ bi − 12di − x then D0 = −2v + bi − 12di − 2x+
bj − 12dj < −2bi−1 + bi − |12di − 2x+ bj − 12dj = −(i− j − 1)(d1 + 2x(i+ j − 3)).
Subcase (c).4. If j < i and v ≥ bi−12di−x thenD0 =
(
bj−12dj
)
−
(
bi−12di
)
< 0.
Thus, in all subcases, D0 < 0.
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(d) Case i ≤ k1 < j. In this case, Zj = (1 − pj)(cF + 2x + v − bj + 2cA), Zi is
concave in v. Hence, D0(v) = Zj − Zi is convex in v. Therefore, D0(v) < 0 for
all v ∈ (bi−1, bi) if and only if D0(bi−1) ≤ 0 and D0(bi−1) ≤ 0. We will show that
this is indeed the case.
Subcase (d).1. At v = bi, Zi =
(
cF − 1
2
di
)
so that:
D0(bi) = (1− pj)(cF + 2cA + 2x− bj + bi)−
(
cF − 1
2
di
)
Let us consider D0(bi) as a function D1 of (i, j), D1(i, j) ≡ D0(bi). First of all,
D1(i+ 1, j)−D1(i, j) = (1− pj)di+1 + 2x > 0
so that D1(i, j) ≤ D1(k1, j). Let us consider D2(j) ≡ (δ2)k1+1−j
cF−1
2
dk1
D1(k1, j):
D2(j) =
cF+2cA+2x−4cA(j−k1)
cF−2cA+2x − (δ2)k1+1−j
Its first difference D3(j) ≡ D2(j + 1)−D2(j) is:
D3(j) = − 4cAcF−2cA+2x − (δ2)k1−j(1− δ2) < 0
Since D2(k1 + 1) = 0, it follows that D2(j) ≤ 0 for j > k1, and D0(bi) ≤ 0.
Subcase (d).2. At v = bi−1, Zi = (cF + x)− |12di − x|.
Subcase (d).2.1. Let di ≤ 2x. Then, i = 1, bi = di, Zi = cF + 12di, so that:
D0(bi−1) = (1− pj)(cF + 2x− bj + 2cA)− (cF + 12d1) ≡ D1(j)
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First, D1(k1 + 1) = −12(d1 + dk1)− bk1
cF−1
2
dk1
cF−2cA+2x < 0. Second, let us consider
D2(j) ≡ (δ2)k1+1−jD1(k1, j) and its first difference D3(j) ≡ D2(j + 1)−D2(j)
D3(j) = −4cA
(
1− pk1+1
)
− (δ2)k1−j(1− δ2)
(
cF + 1
2
d1
)
< 0
Hence, D2(j) is decreasing and D2(j) < 0, and so is D0(bi−1) < 0.
Subcase (d).2.2. Let di ≥ 2x. Then, Zi = cF + 2x− 12di, so that:
D0(bi−1) = (1− pj)(cF + 2x+ bi−1 − bj + 2cA)− (cF + 2x− 12di) ≡ D1(i, j)
First, D1(i + 1, j) −D1(i, j) = (1 − pj)di + 2x > 0 so that D1(i, j) ≤ D1(k1, j).
Next, we consider D2(j) ≡ (δ2)k1+1−jD1(k1, j) and its first difference D3(j) ≡
D2(j+1)−D2(j) : D3(j) = −4cA
(
1−pk1+1
)−(δ2)k1−j(1−δ2)
(
cF− 1
2
dk1+2x
)
< 0.
Hence, D1(k1, j) < 0, D1(i, j) < 0, and D0(bi−1) < 0.
Thus, in all subcases, D0(bi−1) < 0 and D0(bi) < 0. This implies D0 < 0.
(e) Case j ≤ k1 < i. In this case, Zj =
(
cF − v + bj − 12dj
)
, and D0(v) = Zj − Zi
is strictly decreasing in v. Therefore, D0(v) < D0(bi−1) ≡ D1(i, j) for all v ∈
(bi−1, bi):
D1(i, j) =
(
cF − bi−1 + bj − 12dj
)− (1− pi)(cF − 2cA + 2x)
Since D1(i, j + 1) − D1(i, j) = 12(dj+1 + dj) > 0, D1(i, j) ≤ D1(i, k1). Next,
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D1(k1 + 1, k1) = 0. Finally, considering D2(i) ≡ D1(i+ 1, k1)−D1(i, k1) yields:
D2(i) = −2(2cA − x)− 2xpk1+1 −
(
1− (δ2)i−k1−1
)
(1− δ2)
(
cF − 1
2
dk1
)
< 0
Hence, D1(i, k1) < 0, D1(i, j) < 0, and D0 < 0.
Combining the above five cases (a)-(e) we conclude that D0 < 0 for all i 
= j and
v ∈ (bi−1, bi). This implies that the firm of any value (except a zero measure of
marginal values) is strictly better-off by reporting a value from the same an interval
which it’s true value belongs to. This ends the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3 is in the main text.
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